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RECENT CASES
LATERAL BouunmEs-SEcoN

CLAss TmmALNDs. Through deeds from the

State of Washington which do not declare the lateral boundaries of the
subject-matter, plaintiffs and defendants, coterminous upland owners, are
adjacent owners of second class tidelands which lie in a cove and abut
on their upland properties. Plaintiffs instituted action to quiet title to an
area of these flats contending that the lateral boundary separating their
tidelands from the defendants' should be a line perpendicular to the government meander line, at the point of its intersection with the joint
upland boundary of plaintiffs and defendants, projected to the line of
extreme low tide. Such a boundary would deprive defendants of direct
access to navigable water over a portion of their tidelands. After a
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finding in favor of plaintiffs' contention, defendants appeal. Held: The
lateral boundary is to be drawn according to the following formula: the
tidelands should be apportioned between the respective owners so that as
the whole length of the water boundary of the land within the concave
shore is to the whole length of the low water line, so is each landowner's
proportion of the shore line to each owner's share of tidelands along the
line of low water. Spath v. Larsen, 20 Wn. (2d) 500, 148 P. (2d) 834 (1944).
As the court indicated, a variety of formulas for determining the
lateral boundaries of tidelands has arisen out of the interpretation of a
1641 ordinance of the Colony of Massachusetts, Body of Liberties, Article
16, as amended in 1647, 28 MAss. HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS, p. 219; MASS.
COLONIAL LAWS (ed. 1660), p. 50; ed. 1672, pp. 90-1. By the pertinent
portion of the ordinance, title, " Liberties Common," § 2, upland owners are
given property in adjacent tidelands. Realizing that the chief value of
tidelands usually rests in the right of access to navigable water, the
Massachusetts court has interpreted the ordinance as meaning to give
each upland owner an area on the tidelands at low water mark equal in
width to his upland shore boundary. See Gray v. Deluce, 5 Cush. 9, 12
(Mass. 1849). If such a division is impracticable, the upland owner is to
be given a low water boundary proportionate in length to his shore
boundary. Wonson v. Wonson, 14 Allen 71 (Mass., 1867). So, where the
shore boundary is straight, lateral tideland boundaries would be parallel
lines projected at right angles to the low water line from the point of
intersection of the upland lateral boundary and the shore boundary.
However, where the shoreline is concave, forming a cove or bay, the
courts have differed as to the course of the lateral boundaries. There
have developed three main formulas for their determination. First, the
Massachusetts rule as enunciated in Wonson v. Wonson, supra, requires a
ratable distribution of distance along the low water line in proportion to
the length of the tideland owner's upland water boundary. Since the
shoreline is concave, the shore boundary will be longer than the corresponding low water line. Thus, the lateral boundary lines drawn from
each end of the shore boundary to the corresponding ends of the proportionate frontage on low tide line will converge. Rust v. Boston Mill Corp.,
6 Pick. 158 (Mass., 1828). The second is the Maine rule announced in
Emerson v. Taylor, 9 Green. 42, 23 Am. Dec. 531 (Maine, 1832). Here a
base line is drawn connecting the corners of the tideland owner's corresponding upland lot at the intersection of the upland property lines with
the shore boundary. From the points of intersection, lines perpendicular
to the base line are projected to the line of low tide. Since the shore is
not straight, ownership of angular pieces of flats will, by this division, be
unresolved. These portions are then divided equally between the adjacent
owners. Whether the area, the angle, or the low water frontage, of
the angular piece, is to be the basis of division, the Maine court does
not say. The third is the formula already referred to as being adopted
by the lower court in the principal case. Lines perpendicular to the
shore boundary are projected from the points of intersection of shore and
upland lateral boundary lines to the low tide line.
Since the Massachusetts rule most adequately protects second class
tideland owners in their basic right of access to navigable water, and,
at the same time, is easier of application than the Maine rule, it seems
that the Washington court in following the Wonson case not only adopted
the most logical formula for its decision, but also the most workable.
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Washington has a large area of second class tidelands. Since the
principal case, one of first impression in this state, thus affedts ownership
of so much land, the Washington court is to be commended for its very
exhaustive consideration of the principles involved in the case at hand.
E. B. M.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-IMIvTATIONS APPLICABLFE-WRITTEN CONTRACTSIwPnm Lia ur. A and B leased hotel propertyi from X. One month.later

A agreed to sell his interest to B for $600, of which $550 remained unpaid at the time of trial. B entered into negotiations with C, and C agreed
to purchase the lease for $1,300, including $550 to be paid to A. A signed
an option agreement giving C the right to purchase the lease for $550. C
took possession, paid B $750 and assumed complete management of the
property. A brings this action for the $550 due under the option. C contends that the contract, if actually entered into, was within the three
year statute of limitations and outlawed. Held: C became bound by an implied unilateral contract when he took control of the premises thereby accepting the option offer. The resulting contract is deemed to have arisen
out of a written instrument and is, therefore, not barred until after six
years. De Britz v. Sylvia, 121 Wash. Dec. 295, 150 P. (2d) 978 (1944).
The above case involves an interpretation of the Washington statute of
limitations. Rmw Rsv. STAT. § 157(2), provides that "an action upon a
contract in writing, or liability express or implied arising out of a written
agreement" shall be brought within six years. See. 159 (3) provides that
"an action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not
in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument" shall be
brought within three years.
In enacting the above quoted provisions, the legislature seemingly
intended to include within the six year statute any liability that can be
implied arising out of a written instrument. The cases upon the subject
indicate that the Washington Supreme Court has adopted this point of
view. The court has found the six-year statute applicable to implied liabilities arising from written agreements under various factual situations.
That result wag reached in De Britz v. Sylvia, supra, where the court
found an implied liability arising out of an option agreement. Similar
results have been recorded under the following diversified situations of
fact: a co-suretyship agreement arising from a note, Caldwell v. Hurley, 41
Wash. 296, 83 Pac. 318 (1906); an account stated, Vorhees V'. Nabob SilverLead Co., 174 Wash. 5, 24 P. (2d) 114 (1933); a reorganization agreement,
Behneman. v. Schoemer, 141 Wash. 560, 252 Pac. 133 (1927); a bill of lading,
Warren v. Rickles, 129 Wash. 443, 225 Pac. 422 (1924); a joint guarantor
agreement, Pioneer Mining & Ditch Co. v. Davidson, 111 Wash. 262, 190
Pac. 242 (1920); a bill of lading, Ore.-Wash. R. & X. Co. v. Seattle Grain
Co., 106 Wash. 1, 178 Pac. 648, 185 Pac. 583 (1919); and a bond, Lindblom
v. Johnson, 92 Wash. 171, 158 Pac. 972 (1916). See also, Seattle Lodge v.
Goodwin, 143 Wash. 210, 255 Pac. 96 (1927). These cases illustrate a liberal
construction which may encompass a variety of fact situations.
The court, however, has declined to extend the Washington six-year
limitation statute to quasi-contractual obligations implied from written
agreements. In Bicknell v. Garrett, 1 Wn.(2d) 564, 96 P.(2d) 592, 126
A. L. R.258 (1939), the court said:
"We are inclined to the opinion that this statute (RMA, REv.
STAT. § 157(2), supra) does not contemplate quasi-contracts or
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liabilities merely contractual in nature, but liabilities which are
either expressly stated in a written agreement or which follow
by natural and reasonable implication from the promissory language of the agreement from some external source."
A search of the limitation of action statutes of other states has revealed none with wording like that employed by § 157(2), quoted above.
They can be divided generally into three classes:
(1) Contracts unwritten or implied from either written or unwritten
contracts are assigned a shorter period, while completely written contracts are assigned a longer period. The Illinois statute which comes
within this class most nearly approaches the wording of the Washington
statute of any of the state statutes investigated. ILL. REV. STAT. (1943) tit.
18, §§ 16, 17. A recent case will illustrate a typical interpretation of the
Illinois statute: Elec. Contr's Ass'n v. Schulman Elec. Co., 324 Ill. App. 28,
57 N.E. (2d) 220 (1944). See also CiV. PRo. & PRos. CODE OF CAirF. (1941)
§§ 337, 339; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §§ 5-216, 5-217.
(2) All contract actions for written or unwritten contracts are assigned
the same limitation period. ANN. LAws OF MASs. (1938) Vol. 9, c. 260, § 2.
THompsoN's LAWS OF N. Y. (1939) Civ. Pro. Act, § 48. ORE. CoAw. LAws
ANN. (1940) Vol. 1, § 1-204(1).
(3) Limitation periods are fixed for each kind of contract on basis of
subject matter; the form of the contract is immaterial. N. J. STAT. ANN.
(1939) § 2:24-1. REv. CODE OF DEL. (1939) c. 146.
It is thus apparent that REM. REV. STAT. § 157 (2) is unique when compared with the statutes of other states and that in Washington the court
gives this statute a liberal interpretation.
W. A. Z.

